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Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups
From the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v. Soares ' — Edward J. Soares, Richard S.
Allen and Leon Easterling were indicted for first-degree murder 2 after the
stabbing death of Andrew Puopolo, a Harvard University senior and varsity
football player. The homicide occurred in the course of a late-night brawl in
the notorious Combat Zone of Downtown Boston, Massachusetts." All three
defendants were black; the victim was white. Massachusetts state law permit-
ted each defendant the opportunity to exercise sixteen peremptory challenges.
The prosecution was entitled to exercise forty-eight peremptory challenges. 4
Exercising forty-four of its challenges,' the prosecution eliminated twelve of
the thirteen black jurors drawn from the jury venire. 6 The defendants raised
timely objections' and alleged that the systematic use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude all but one black juror from the jury panel had deprived
. them of a fair and impartial jury. The trial judge, citing Massachusetts prece-
dent., 8
 denied each objection. Subsequently, the jury, composed of eleven
' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
Easterling was indicted and convicted of assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon, receiving a sentence of eight to ten years. Soares was convicted of
two counts of simple assault and battery; those convictions being placed on file. Alien
was acquitted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. 1979 Mass.
Adv. Sh. at 593-94, 387 N.E.2d at 502-03.
The entire incident is fully described by the court in the first segment of its
opinion. Id. at 594-98, 387 N.E.2d at 503-04. Before reaching the issue of peremptory
challenges, the court found that the convictions were warranted by the evidence intro-
duced at trial. Id. at 602-07, 387 N.E.2d at 506-08. But see note II supra (second trial
concluded in one conviction for manslaughter and two acquittals). The homicide, with
its obvious racial overtones, received excessive media attention for several weeks. The
victim, Andrew Puopolo, remained hospitalized in a coma for five weeks. He arrived at
the Tufts-New England Medical Center without active brain function and was sus-
tained by artificial means during the ensuing weeks. Boston Globe, Nov. 16, 1978, at 1,
col. 3.
4
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 29 (West 1968) (each defendant granted
16 challenges, prosecution allowed number equal to that of all defendants combined).
See generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECT/ON PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN CommyrmENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 160-75 [hereinafter cited as VAN DYKE]; 1 BUSCH, LAW AND
TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 817 (1959); A.B.A. Standards Relating to Trial by Jury 70-78
(1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Standards].
• The court failed to comment on the fact that the prosecution did not
exhaust all its available challenges and, yet, allowed one black juror to remain on the
panel. Nevertheless, implicit in the court's theory of diffused impartiality is the notion
that a large reduction in group representation is no less harmful than total exclusion.
See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
6 See note 169 infra. See Comment, 64 MASS. L. REV. 139, 140 (1979) (eight
per cent representation of blacks on panel not greatly disproportionate compared to
twelve per cent representation on jury venire); cf. Hayden, Henna & Seigel, Prosecuto-
rial Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Informational Use in the
Massachusetts July Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 768, passim (1978) (statistical
evidence yielding tentative conclusions regarding the use of peremptory challenges).
• See text and note at note 152 infra.
' See text and notes at notes 96-98 infra.
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whites and one black, 9 convicted all three defendants of first-degree mur-
der. 10
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted the defendants a new
trial " and HELD: elimination of a discrete group from the petit jury through
purposeful exercise of peremptory challenges, motivated solely by the as-
sumption of shared, similar biases among members of a discrete group, vio-
lates a defendant's right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community guaranteed by Articles 12 and 15 of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution: 2 Three justices concurred,' 3 arguing that there was no occasion for
a decision on constitutional grounds " but that a new trial should be granted
in light of the extraordinary publicity and racial tension surrounding the orig-
inal trial's
The Soares decision is significant in several respects. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court, faced with restrictive federal precedent, turned to the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution for independent state grounds " and radically de-
parted from earlier state court decisions by opening the peremptory challenge
to inquiry." The court in Soares has significantly affected traditional use of
" Sixteen jurors were sworn as the petit jury at the outset of the trial in order
to prevent a mistrial if a juror were unable to continue at some time during the trial.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 234, § 26B (West 1968); MASS. R. GRIM. P. 20(d)(1). How-
ever, to ensure that all jurors remain attentive throughout the trial, alternates are not
designated until immediately before the jury retires for deliberations. The only juror
who is exempted from such designation is the jury foreman. The trial judge in Soares
appointed the sole remaining black juror as the jury foreman. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh.
607-08, 387 N.E.2d. at 508. This indicated that the trial judge was cognizant of the
prosecution tactics and made sure that at least one black juror would reach the jury
room. See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 950, 967, 365 N.E.2c1 839,
847-48 (1977) (Brown, J., concurring).
"' Conviction of first-degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence without
parole. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 1968).
" The results of the second trial were striking. Jury selection took almost two
weeks and exhausted a special venire of three hundred jurors. Eventually, the jury,
consisting of ten whites and six blacks (eight men and eight women) returned verdicts
of not guilty against defendants Allen and Soares and a verdict of guilty of manslaugh-
ter against defendant Easterling. Boston Globe, December 15, 1979, at I, col. 4. Essen-
tially, this jury found no evidence of premeditation or joint enterprise on the part of
the three men. Cf. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 604-07, 387 N.E.2d. at 506-07 (first-degree
murder convictions warranted by the evidence). The manslaughter conviction indicates
that Easterling used excessive force while defending himself during the brawl with the
football players.
12 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 594, 387 N.E.2d. at 503. During their appellate
arguments the defendants stressed article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution as the
basis of their appeal. Id. at 613, 387 N.E.2d. at. 510. Article 12 states in pertinent part:
"and no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property,
immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of
his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgement of his peers or the law of the land."
MAss. CoNs -r. art. 12.
' 3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 634, 387 N.E.2d at 519 (Braucher, J., concurring).
" Id. at 634-35, 387 N.E.2d at 519.
15 Id. at 635, 387 N.E.2d at 519; see note 3 supra.
See text and notes at notes 96-123 infra.
17
 See text and notes at notes 140-51 infra.
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the peremptory challenge. Specifically, the court has placed an additional
burden on the voir dire process," has created procedural uncertainty,• and,
ironically, may have hampered the efforts of counsel to obtain a fully disin-
terested jury. 2 °
This casenote will discuss first the three earlier decisions that most influ-
enced the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Soares. The important.
elements of the Soares opinion then will be analyzed in detail. Following this
analysis, the likely procedural effect of the Soares decision in future cases at
the trial level will be considered. Finally, as a suggestion to limit the scope of
the decision, this casenote will offer an alternative to the methodology used by
the court in Soares.
1. THE PRECEDENTIAL BASIS OF SOARES
A. The False Promise of Equal Protection
Prior to the United Suites Supreme Court decision in Swain v. Alabama,'
black defendants had utilized the fourteenth amendment, with limited success,
to challenge jury selection procedures which systematically excluded blacks
from jury lists and jury venires. 22 These defendants claimed that purposeful
elimination of their societal group from the jury selection process was a denial
of equal protection." In recognizing the validity of this equal protection chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court required a defendant to establish three elements.
First, in order to have standing, the defendant must be a member of the
group excluded." Second, convincing evidence of a pattern of group exclu-
sion must be presented.'" Finally, the defendant must demonstrate that the
'" See text and notes al notes 152-63 infra.
1" See text and notes at notes 164-80 infra.
2" See text and notes at notes 181-97 infra.
21
 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
22 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
These successful challenges were in situations where there had been total exclusion of
black jurors from the jury lists and jury pools for an extended period. See Daughtry,
Cross-Sectionalism in Jury Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. I,
17 11.68 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Daughtryl.
" Until Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Supreme Court had
refused to consider allegations of systematic exclusion in situations other than racial
discrimination. Strauder v. West. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Hernandez introduced
the term "identifiable group" as a means of extending the systematic exclusion
rationale. 347 U.S. at 478. However, courts interpreted the term narrowly and also
found sufficiently rational reasons for excluding groups even if they were considered
identifiable. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 571 (1961); Daughtry, supra note 22, at
13-14 nn.49-52.
" Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); see note 22 supra; see
generally Kuhniury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAI,. L. REV. 235 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Kuhn]; Comment, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L. J. 322 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Fair Jury Selection Procedures].
25 Theoretically, a systematic exclusion can occur without total elimination of a
group. However, under the influence of Strauder, courts were often reticent to infer
discriminatory intent from were disparity as opposed to complete exclusion. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Daughtry, supra note 22, at 17-18 n.68 (cases
collected therein).
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jury selection procedures were intentionally carried out to produce the appar-
ent exclusion. 2 "
Defendants asserting a claim of systematic exclusion therefore faced a
heavy burden of proof coupled with the pragmatic difficulty of assembling
sufficient objective evidence to show an intentional pattern of exclusion. 27
Since the public officials responsible for the general selection of potential
jurors and public records of jury lists were reasonably accessible, defendants
prior to the Swain decision confined their efforts to prove systematic exclusion
to the early stages of jury selection, namely jury lists and jury pools." With
the granting of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, proponents of
jury selection reform saw Swain as art opportunity to extend equal protection
guarantees to methods of petit jury selection in an individual tria1. 2 "
Richard Swain, a black, was convicted of rape by an all-white jury. Under
Alabama's struck-jury system," all blacks had been eliminated from the jury
venire by peremptory challenges. After the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction, 3 ' the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." De-
fendant Swain advanced two arguments, both alleging that the State's
methods of petit jury selection systematically excluded blacks in violation of
the equal protection clause. First, the defendant. urged that the prosecution,
through the purposeful exercise of peremptory challenges, had eliminated all
black jurors from the petit jury that eventually convicted him of rape." This
argument focused specifically on the prosecutor's tactics during Swain's trial,
alleging that the elimination of all blacks called to serve on the jury was suffi-
cient demonstration of a systematic exclusion.
As a second argument, the defendant asserted that., in every criminal
trial, the state prosecutors consistently and intentionally exercised peremptory
challenges to remove all blacks from each petit jury with the result that no
black had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County, Alabama." This
2" This aspect of the test required the defendant to establish the subjective
intent of those responsible for jury selection. Ostensibly, if the defendant could estab-
lish substantial disparity over a period of time the court would be warranted in finding
an intent to discriminate rather than the mere chance of the jury wheel. Hernandez,
347 U.S. at 482; but see Swain, 380 U.S. at 208. Nevertheless, anything short of total
exclusion was usually insufficient. See note 22 supra.
27 See Daughtry, supra note 22, at 26-28.
28 See note 22 supra.
2" Sec note 40 ily'ra.
3" The "struck jury" varies from the more common systems of petit jury selec-
tion. A jury venire is assembled which, after all challenges for cause, equals the total
number of peremptory challenges available to both sides and the total number of
jurors (normally twelve) needed for the petit jury. Then counsel front both sides exer-
cise all their challenges alternately. Id. at 210; ALA. CODE tit. 30. § 64 (1958). Those
jurors who remain after all peremptory challenges have been exercised become the
petit jury for the trial. Some feel this is the most equitable form of petit jury selection
because it eliminates any uncertainty from the challenge process. A.B.A. Standards,
supra note 4, at 76.
275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 636 (1963).
32 377 U.S. 915 (1964).
3" 380 U.S. at 203. See Straucler v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (state
statute qualifying only whites for jury duty held unconstitutional).
34 380 U.S. at 222-23.
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second contention, which alleged a pattern of intentional exclusion over a
period of time, resembled more closely the earlier decisions recognizing sys-
tematic exclusion arguments. 35 Unfortunately, however, this approach also
placed an insurmountable burden of proof on Swain and on future defen-
dants.'"
In the Swain decision, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
the defendant's first. argument 37 and, while recognizing the basic rationale of
his second argument, framed a prohibitive standard to be satisfied by future
defendants. 38 Addressing first the assertion that peremptory challenges were
used systematically to exclude blacks during the defendant's trial, the Court
held that the use of peremptory challenges in any one trial, even if all mem-
bers of one race are excluded, will not constitute a violation of the fourteenth
amendment.'" When exercised by a single prosecutor to shape the composi-
tion of one petit jury, peremptory challenges are not subject_ to the demands
of the equal protection clause even if motivated by race, religion, or national-
ity. 4n Categorizing the peremptory challenge as a fundamental element in a
trial by jury, 4 ' the Court refused to make "a radical change in the nature and
operation of the challenge" within the context of any individual trial. 42 In
essence, the Court created an ironclad shield for the peremptory challenge,
holding that in each trial such challenges are beyond the Court's control and
may be used without inquiry. 43
"F' This argument focused on a series of trials rather than a single trial in its
attempt to show a systematic exclusion.
"" See note 41 infra.
" 7 380 U.S. at 222.
a"
	 at 223.
'4" Id. at 222.
4" Id. at 221-22. Swain immediately drew strong criticism from those who saw
the case as the opportunity to extend equal protection standards to the petit jury. See
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White
Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 103, 135-39 (1965); Fair Jury Selection Procedures, supra note 24; 1979 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 612 n.11, 387 N.E.2d at 510 (articles collected therein).
4 ' 380 U.S. at 219. The Court in Swain gives the peremptory challenge a
paramount role in a jury trial, concluding that "... the challenge is one of the most
important rights secured to the accused: - Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396
(1894); see Lewis v. United States, 176 U.S. 379, 376 (1892) (denial of right to
peremptory challenges reversable error). The peremptory challenge allows either side
to remove a juror offended by probing voir dire or an unsuccessful challenge for
cause. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 621 n.24, 384 N.E.2d at 513. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at
147-51. The Swain majority is sharply criticized by Mr. Justice Goldberg for apparently
making the peremptory challenge a fundamental right. Swain, 380 U.S. at 243
(Goldberg, I, dissenting); Stilson v. United States, 259 U.S. 593 (1919).
42 380 U.S. at 221-22.
" Id. at 220. But see 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 622 n.26, 387 N.E.2d at 514. The
Soares court points out the inconsistency of this language with later language in Swath.
By conceding that proof or systematic exclusion would overcome the presumption
favoring the prosecutor," the Court in Swain admitted that improperly exercised
peremptory challenges may be controlled by the court. 380 U.S. at 224. The court in
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Turning to the second element of the defendant's argument, the Court
conceded that, if proven, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to
exclude all blacks from petit jury service over an extended period would con-
stitute an equal protection violation. 44 The Court's standard, however, placed
a weighty burden of proof on the defendant by requiring a showing that
peremptory challenges have been employed systematically over a period of
time solely by the prosecution and for reasons totally unrelated to any indi-
vidual trial.'" This test produces the paradoxical result that a defendant. must
prove abuse of preremptory challenges in a series of trials without any right
to question their use in any single trial.'" The failure of any defendant ever
to demonstrate systematic exclusion under this rule underscores the illusory
protection offered by the Court in Swain."
The conclusive presumption in Swain, which endorsed the use of
peremptory challenges in any single trial, was the product of three considera-
tions. First, the Court accepted the notion that racial factors were a legitimate
44
 Id. at 223.
4'
 380 U.S. at 223-25.
4 ' 1 Id. at 222. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge:
A Valued Common Law Privilege In Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause [hereinafter
cited as Prosecutor's Exercise], 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554, 560 (1977).
' 7
 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611, 387 N.E.2d at 509. Massachusetts precedent has
consistently adhered to the policy of Swain although the decision had never been speci-
fically incorporated under the state constitution. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 609-10 n.9,
387 N.E.2d at 509. Wheeler also supplanted California precedent adhering to the Swain
rule. See. People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3c1 694, 464 P.2(1 64, 83 Cal. Rpt•. 608 (1970); People
v. Boyd, 16 Cal. App. 3d 901, 94 Cal. Rpm.. 575 (1975). See Comment, 13 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1082, 1091 n.47 (1979).
United States v. McDaniels, 378 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974) is most often cited
as an example of judicial dissatisfaction with the Swain rule. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
620, 387 N.E.2d at 513. In the interests of justice, the McDaniels court granted a new
trial under FED. R. Cium. P. 33 because peremptory challenges had eliminated six of
seven blacks from the venire. 379 F. Stipp. at 1244. Nevertheless, the decision has
failed to affect significantly subsequent. case law. See Prosecutor's Exercise, supra note 46,
at 562. See also United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2c1 Cir. 1977) (lower court holding of
systematic exclusion in the use of peremptory challenges reversed upon discovery of
misapplied statistical evidence).
Of note is a recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision which apparently found
sufficient evidence of systematic exclusion to warrant a new trial. State v. Brown, 371
So. 2c1 751 (La. 1979). A series of eight appeals based on the alleged misuse of
peremptory challenges had reached the Louisiana Supreme Court from the same
county. Id. at 753. The court concluded that this number of cases coupled with tes-
timony from a state prosecutor, constituted "more than a bare showing of prosecuto-
rial use of a disproportionate number of challenges against blacks." Id. at 754. The
decision is puzzling because the court neither rejected Swain nor used the state con-
stitution as an analytical foundation. Instead the court, in effect, bifurcated the Swain
rule. The state must now show that no intentional discrimination has taken place once
the defendant has made a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion. Id. at 753.
For excellent critiques of Swain, see KUHN, supra note 24, at 288-92; VAN DYKE,
supra note 4, at 56-58, 150-52; Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Com-
munity, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1430-33.
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trial-related motivation for peremptory challenges." Second, the Court
feared that opening the peremptory challenge to attack even on narrow racial
grounds would alter radically a fundamental element of a jury trial." Finally,
the Court's holding reflected the analytical inability of systematic exclusion
arguments to deal effectively with small numbers of jurors. First developed
during attacks on those early stages of jury selection that incorporated large
numbers of jurors, the focus of this equal protection analysis was simply too
broad to protect fully the individual defendant.
By the time Swain was decided, a change in the analysis of jury selection
cases had begun. A divergent line of cases promised greater protection to the
individual defendant by reducing his burden in demonstrating the exclusion
of societal groups from jury service." The single-most important steps in this
change was the shift from the equal protection clause to the sixth amendment
as the foundation for attacks on state jury-selection processes:"
B. The Sixth Amendment's Guarantee of a Representative Cross Section
In Taylor v. Louisiana,'" the defendant challenged the validity of a state
statute requiring women to file a written request before being included on
jury lists." The defendant alleged that this statute effectively eliminated an
identifiable group from jury service and, consequently, denied him a full op-
portunity to obtain a jury drawn from a wide spectrum of society." The facts
in Taylor, a male protesting the underinclusion of women, squarely presented
the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to recognize explicitly
a defendant's right to attack state methods of jury selection under the sixth
amendment.''''
In the Taylor decision, the Court held thet a jury drawn from a represent-
ative cross-section of the community is an essential component of a defen-
dam's sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. 5 " Declaring the
Louisiana state statute invalid, the Court removed analysis of jury selection
procedures from the context of the equal protection clause and created an
independent constitutional foundation for a defendant's right to a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community. Further, the Court's
method of analysis significantly reduced a defendant's burden of proof by
requiring the state, after proof of a pattern of apparent exclusion, to present
"ample justification" for a system which operates to exclude a distinctive
group in society."
48 380 U.S. at 220-21.
Id. at 219; see note 41 supra.
5" See text at note 27 supra.
5 ' See text at note 56 infra.
" 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
53 Id. at 525. The Taylor decision does not explicitly address the issue of
peremptory challenges.
54 Id. at 524.
" Cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 525 (1972) (Court failed to reach the
issue of the exclusion of women).
5 " 419 U.S. at 528.
57 Id. at 533-35. The defendant's burden of showing a pattern of apparent
exclusion in Taylor was hardly difficult. The Court, without question, characterized the
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As the first. step in its decision, the Taylor Court declared that a defen-
dant should have standing to challenge the representative character of his
jury regardless of his relation to the group excluded. 58
 This conclusion rested
on a recognition of two important policies. First, the Court stated that the
exclusion of identifiable segments of the community is not consonant with
democratic principles of representative government." Second, while refusing
to assume that, a particular group would vote consistently as a class, the Court
perceived a subtle prejudice to the defendant's interests when jury selection
removes from the courtroom the imponderable "interplay of influence" of
one group against the other."
Having found the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community fundamental to the sixth amendment, the Court
employed a two-part analysis, placing the initial burden on the defendant to
prove a prima facie violation of his right to a representative cross-section of
the community in his jury."' Recently the United States Supreme Court, in
Duren v. Missouri," clearly delineated the elements of this prima facie show-
ing. According to Duren, a defendant must demonstrate that a "distinctive"
group in the community has been systematically underrepresented in jury ve-
nires for reasons inherent. to the jury selection process used by the State."
Once the defendant has established the elements of this prima facie showing,
the state must justify the apparent imbalance of representation." Because the
defendant's rights are fundamental to the sixth amendment, a State's jury
selection procedures will not he redeemed by reasons satisfying a minimum
rationality test. Instead, as the Court emphasized in Duren, the State must
show a significant state interest which prevents compliance with the goals em-
bodied by the concept of the representative cross-section of the community."
Consequently, a defendant's test of a states jury selection procedures
under Taylor serves the two-fold purpose of securing his individual rights
Louisiana statute as eliminating 53% of the available persons capable of serving as
jurors. Id. at 524, 531.
38 Id. at 526. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Peters granted standing to a
white man to challenge the exclusion of blacks from his grand jury. But cf. Alexander
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 525, 533 (1972) (dictum that the right of male to challenge
exclusion of females finds no support in precedent).
5" Id. at 530.
"" Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. at. 187, 193-94
(1946)). See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. at 503-04, cited in 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617-18,
387 N.E.2d at 512.
" 1
 419 U.S. at 533-35; see note 57 supra.
"' 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979).
"" Id. at 668. Although the Court in Duren continues to use the term "system-
atic" to describe the pattern of group exclusion, the term does not carry the same con-
notation as in earlier decisions under the equal protection clause. In Duren and similar
decisions, an exclusion is systematic when a distinctive group fails to participate in the
jury process over a period of time. Proof of an apparent. pattern of exclusion will raise
a presumption of intentional exclusion which must. he rebutted by the state. In the
earlier equal protection decisions, an exclusion would not be systematic until the de-
fendant had also shown a discriminatory intent either in the selection process or the
conduct of jury officers.
64
 Id. at 670.
" Id. See text. at note 62 supra.
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while guaranteeing "community participation in the administration of the
criminal law."" For present purposes, however, it must be noted that the
focus of the Taylor Court remained squarely on the pre-trial stages of jury
selection." With respect to the petit jury, the Court specifically cautioned that
juries "actually chosen" are not required to mirror the comrnunity." 8 On the
federal level, no decision has attempted to extend the rationale of Taylor to
the petit jury stage of jury selection. On the state level, the California Su-
preme Court recognized that the Taylor rationale had the potential to extend
greater protection to an individual defendant than had the earlier decision in
Swain. In People v. Wheeler,r 9
 the California court fashioned a unique state
remedy for defendants protesting prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges.
C. State Extension of Federal Precedent
In Wheeler, an all-white jury convicted two black defendants of first-
degree murder in the death of a white store owner during the course of a
robbery." At trial, the prosecution, through the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges, successfully excluded all potential black jurors from the jury venire.'
On appeal, the defendants alleged a denial of their right to an impartial jury
guaranteed by article one, section sixteen, of the California Constitution."
In a question of first. impression, the California Supreme Court held that
its state constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate a
legally cognizable group from the petit jury." Noting that the United States
Supreme Court. in Taylor had applied the constitutional guarantee of a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community to the states, the
California court. concluded that peremptory challenges which eliminate a le-
gally cognizable group frustrate the "primary purpose" of a defendant's sixth
amendment. rights guaranteed by Taylor."
A preliminary but nevertheless crucial aspect of the Wheeler decision was
the court's careful delineation of an adequate and independent state ground.
First, the court noted the arguable distinction between Swain, a decision based
on the equal protection clause, and Taylor, a decision based on the sixth
amendment." The court believed, however, that the Swain holding with re-
spect to peremptory challenges was undisturbed by the more recent Taylor
decision and, consequently, refused to draw a specious distinction. Instead,
the Wheeler court asserted that if the question were presented again, the Su-
"" 419 U.S. at 530.
"' hi. at 538.
"8 Id.
"" 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2c1 748, 148 Cal. Rpm 890, See Comment, 13 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 1082 (1979); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the
Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1170 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutorial
Misuse]; Comment, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 599 (1979).
" 22 Cal. 3d at 262, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rim•. 893.
7 ' Id. at 262-65, 583 P.2d at 753-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. 893-95.
72 Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
73 Id. at. 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
74 Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rpt.r. at 902.
75 Id. at 284, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
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preme Court would "reaffirm Swain and reach the same result under the
representative cross section rule as it did under the equal protection clause." 76
While recognizing Swain's continued vitality, the court also noted the fail-
ure of Swain to provide even minimal protection to defendants and asserted
that this sterile promise of protection justified an independent state ground
for the Wheeler decision. 77 The Swain standard, observed the court, fails to
safeguard the rights of defendants who are victimized before any discrimina-
tory pattern in the use of peremptory challenges emerges. In addition, the
standard places an onerous burden of proof on the defendant who, as party
to but one criminal proceeding, must attempt to overcome the practical im-
possibility of assembling sufficient evidence. 78 Since a state court, when inter-
preting its constitution, may guarantee stale citizens greater rights than those
extended by "the divergent decisions of the United States Supreme Court," 79
the court in Wheeler forcefully concluded that the Swain rule "is not to be
followed in our courts" and that the California Constitution shall govern all
claims of defendants alleging the misuse of peremptory challenges."
The greater protection which the Wheeler decision offers defendants is
found in the court's interpretation of the sixth amendment guarantee of a
jury drawn from a fair and impartial pool. Attempting to prevent those uses
of the peremptory challenge which frustrate this constitutional guarantee, the
court created a duty to preserve "that degree of representativeness" which the
random draw from the jury venire produces in the petit jury. 8 ' A representa-
tive jury contains a diversity of perspective and opinion. 82 Within the petit
jury, the court reasoned, each individual possesses "opinions, preconceptions,
or even deep-rooted biases" which are often the result of their association
with a particular element of society. 83 Since an individual's personal outlook
may be similar to that of other persons within the same societal group, the
court acknowledged the existence of shared group perspective and termed
this notion "group bias." 84
Equating the preservation of group bias with the rationale of the sixth
amendment guarantees, 85 the Wheeler court found that the overall impartiality
of petit juries is secured by the "interaction of diverse beliefs and values"
among the jurors. 8fi Thus, group bias must be protected in order to ensure
that the "representative biases ... to the extent that they are antagonistic, will
tend to cancel each other out." 87 If potential jurors could be challenged for
holding those general perspectives which the sixth amendment guarantees are
7" Id. at 284-85, 583 P.M at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
77 Id. at 286-87, 583 P.2c1 at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
78 Id. at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
78 Id. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rpt.r. at 908.
MO Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
" Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
83 Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
" Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
"" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
87 Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761, !48 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
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designed to foster, then those biases associated with a majority group would
dominate a jury after the minority group biases were purposefully eliminated
by the use of peremptory challenges." Therefore, the court concluded that
the random composition of a petit jury may be altered only by challenges for
cause and peremptory challenges motivated by specific reasons associated with
the trial at hand. 8 "
Peremptory challenges which are based on group bias, however, cannot
be allowed to undermine the broad diversity of opinion represented in the
petit jury." Extending a co-equal right of objection to the prosecution," the
Wheeler court framed a proof and remedy procedure aimed at eliminating
those uses of the peremptory challenge which eliminate legally cognizable
groups. Beginning with a presumption in favor of the party utilizing
peremptory challenges, the court required a showing by the objecting party
that a "cognizable group" 92 has been excluded and a "strong likelihood" that
group affiliation is the reason for such an exclusion. 63 If both elements are
established, an inference of improper group exclusion arises and the allegedly
offending party must then justify its use of peremptory challenges." 4 If such
a justification does not satisfy the trial judge, he must. quash the venire and
select an entirely new jury panel, thereby restoring representational balance to
the jury selection procedures."
Wheeler represents a novel state appraisal of the peremptory challenge.
The rationale used by the California Supreme Court to justify a limited in-
quiry into the traditionally unassailable right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges was accepted and applied again by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Commonwealth v. Soares.
" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at. 902; see 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh.
626-27, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
'" 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
"" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
91 Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
" 2 Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rpm at 905. Since blacks were
clearly a cognizable group, the court declined to enumerate other cognizable groups;
preferring instead to define other such groups on a case-by-case basis. Id. Recently, in
Rubio v. Superior Court,   Cal. 3d  , 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734
(1979), the California Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether resident
aliens and ex-felons constitute a cognizable group. The court framed a two-part test
for the determination of cognizable group status. First, persons within a group must
share a common perspective "precisely because they are members of that group." Id.,
593 P.2d at 598, 153 Cal. Rpm 439 (emphasis in original). Fearful, however, that
cognizable groups would be narrowly defined, the court added a second element. In
order to establish a legally cognizable group, the aggrieved party must also dem-
onstrate that no group in the community is "capable of adequately representing the
perspective of the group assertedly excluded." Id., 593 P.2d at 598, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
729. Looking to the instant case, the court found that persons convicted of mis-
demeanors and naturalized citizens share similar attitudes with ex-felons and resident
aliens. A vigorous dissent argued that the court had created a "vicarious representa-
tion" standard. Id., 593 P.2d at 604, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
" 3 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
" 4 Id. at 282-83, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
"' Id.
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II. COMMONWEALTH V. SOARES: REJECTION OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT
AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE WHEELER RATIONALE
Prior to the Soares decision, several Massachusetts defendants had raised
the abuse of peremptory challenges as an issue on appeal.• Various defen-
dants chose, unsuccessfully, to tackle the burdensome task of satisfying the
Swain burden of proof; 97 others searched, also unsuccessfully, for an alterna-
tive argument by which to circumvent the restrictive precedent of Swain."
The argument presented by the defendants in Soares, however, was a question
of first impression in Massachusetts." The defendants asserted that article
twelve of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, which
guaranteed a defendant's right to a trial before a jury of his peers, offered an
alternative state ground permitting the court at least to consider the alleged
abuse of peremptory challenges by the prosecution."°
The Supreme Judicial Court accepted the defendant's "invitation to
reexamine the issue" of prosecutorial practices in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, and noted the similar route chosen by the California Supreme Court
in Wheeler. Echoing the reasoning of the Wheeler court, citing the negligible
protection offered by Swain, and noting Swain's history of uniformly unfavor-
able criticism, the court in Soares refused to follow Swain and "perfunctorily"
reject the defendants' claims."' Instead, the court turned to the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution and delineated the qualities of a jury guaranteed by
article twelve.' 1z
Several Massachusetts decisions previously had concluded that a fair
and impartial jury embodies a cross-section of the community.'"" While not
specifically incorporating this concept under article twelve, 10" these decisions
demonstrated, nevertheless, that a defendant's right to a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community is a guarantee accepted by Mas-
sachusetts courts.'" Similar to the jury-selection decisions on the federal
level, however, these state decisions had considered this concept only with
respect to the preliminary stages of jury selection, namely, jury lists and jury
pools.'" Consequently. the court in Soares faced the task of extending to the
"6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 367 Mass. 419, 326 N.E.2d 6 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Talbert, 357 Mass. 146, 256 N.E.2d 748 (1970).
" 7 367 Mass. at 420, 326 N.E.2d at 7 (court refused to "transmute peremptory
challenges into challenges for cause''); 357 Mass. at 147, 256 N.E.2d at 749.
"8 COM111011Wealth v. King, 366 Mass. 6, 313 N.E.2d 869 (1974) (court refused
to formulate a new rule for the exercise of peremptory challenges under general
supervisory jurisdiction).
"" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 609-10 n.9, 387 N.E.2d at 509 n.9.
199
 Id. at 612-13, 387 N.E.2d at 510.
"" Id. at 613 n.12, 387 N.E.2d at 510 n.12.
"" See note 12 supra.
103 Id. at 614, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 364 Mass.
87, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 246 N.E.2d 433
(1969).
See note 103 supra.
"5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 614, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11.




final stage of jury selection—the petit jury—a defendant's right to trial by a
jury representing a cross-section of the community.
For its rationale, the court in Soares turned to that line of United States
Supreme Court decisions which eventually led to the recognition of a defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community.'" The court noted that in these decisions, the
growing concern for an individual defendant's right to a properly constituted
jury was based on a number of convergent policy considerations.'" The
court focused particularly on the policy, most clearly articulated in Taylor, that
broad group participation assures that the "commonsense judgment of the
community" will be reflected in a jury verdict.'° 3 Thus, the court concluded
that a key objective of a jury selection process which draws jurors from all
identifiable segments of the community is the assurance that a "diffused
impartiality"—a diverse range of opinions, perspectives and qualities of
human nature—will appear in any individual jury.""
The phrase "diffused impartiality" appeared originally in a dissenting
opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Theil v. Southern Pacific Co."' In Soares,
however, the Supreme Judicial Court infused the term with a special signifi-
cance in making it the goal of petit jury selection. Portraying juror interaction
as "dynamic commingling of the ideas and biases" of each juror, the court
.stated that every person is influenced by the "interests and preferences which
are the product of his cultural, family and community experience." 112
Further, the court reasoned that particular elements of society, "discrete
groups," 13 may share a common perspective and the positive contribution
which an individual group member makes to the jury debate is the assertion
of his opinion, even if it is derived from group affiliation." 4 Consequently,
the diffused impartiality of a properly constituted petit jury represents the
diverse community attitudes and beliefs that are essential to impartial jury
deliberations and, therefore, a fair trial."'
The court then scrutinized the state's method of selecting jury panels to
determine if such procedures unreasonably threatened a defendant's newly-
created right to diffused impartiality in a petit jury.'" Deferring to adminis-
trative concerns and simple impracticality, the Soares court refused to require
that a petit jury mirror the community. 17 The court recognized that chal-
lenges for cause and the vagaries of the random draw unavoidably alter the
composition of a petit jut-y." 3 The court required, however, that peremptory
1 ° 7 Id. at 614-21, 387 N.E.2d at 511-13.
"8 Id. at 615-16 n.17, 387 N.E.2d at 511.
103 Id. at 616, 387 N.E.2d at 511 (quoting 419 U.S. at 530).
"° 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
1 " 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"2 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 625-26, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
113
 Id. at 627-28, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
114 Id. at 624-26, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
"5 Id. at 619-24, 387 N.E.2d at 512-14.
"" Id. at 627, 387 N.E.2d at 516 (citing 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 903).
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 619-21, 387 N.E.2d at 512-13.
"" Id. ai 620-21, 387 N.E.2c1 at 513.
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challenges satisfy a more rigorous analysis in the interest of preserving dif-
fused impartiality within the petit jury.''°
The court in Soares held that the guarantee of diffused impartiality re-
quires that the peremptory challenge be restricted in certain circumstances.'"
If the right to a petit jury that reflects a cross-section of the community is "to
signify more than hollow words," the systematic use of peremptory challenges
to exclude potential jurors solely because of membership in a discrete group
must be prohibited."' The court maintained that its holding does not radi-
cally affect the peremptory challenge. Instead, such challenges retain a sig-
nificant role in eliminating "those jurors whose unique relationship to the par-
ticular case raises the spectre of individual bias." 122 Peremptory challenges
which eliminate those elements of the broad community conscience that are
incorporated in a petit jury by the preservation of diffused impartiality frus-
trate the competitive interplay of diverse opinion guaranteed by article twelve
of the Declaration of Rights.' 23
The court in Soares did not limit the right to question the use of
peremptory challenges solely to defendants. The court acknowledged the
right of the prosecution to a jury which is likely to reach a fair decision.'"
Defendants are no less likely than the prosecution to challenge jurors based
on association with discrete groups. If a question were properly presented on
appeal, the court asserted that "the Commonwealth is equally entitled to a
representative jury." 125 Thus, while possessing only limited appeal rights, the
State may object at trial to defense tactics designed to eliminate particular
groups from the petit jury. 126
 The right to diffused impartiality is extended
equally to prosecution and defense in order to safeguard the process of jury
deliberations by assuring the influence of diverse viewpoints upon the ulti-
mate decision.
The Supreme Judicial Court, having defined the purpose and scope of
diffused impartiality, set forth a two-part method of proof. This method was
designed to preclude the use of peremptory challenges which are based on a
juror's group affiliation without inhibiting their legitimate function in
"" Id. at 622-23, 387 N.E.2d at 514. See, contra, text and note at note 47 supra
(decisions therein which adhere to Swain rule of unregulated peremptory challenges);
United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), affd without opin., 620
F.2d 286 (2d C:ir. 1980) (Swain remains binding precedent on federal courts). In con-
trast, the Soares and Wheeler decisions required trial courts to discern the motives be-
hind peremptory challenges in order to distinguish between specific and group-related
reasons for peremptory challenges. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623-24, 387 N.E.2d at 514;
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902; cf. People v.
Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978) (pretrial knowledge
that witnesses will relate racial slurs during testimony insufficient reason to justify chal-
lenges aimed at black jurors).
12" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624-26, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
121 Id. at 622-23, 387 N.E.2d at 514.
122 Id. at 623, 387 N.E.2d at 514.
123
 Id. at 624-26, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
124 Id. at 629-30 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35.
125 Id .
120 See text at note 178 infra,
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eliminating individual bias.' 27
 The court placed an initial burden on the party
alleging group exclusion. Such parties must overcome a rebuttable presump-
tion that peremptory challenges are being properly exercised. Following an
objection, the complaining party must establish both a pattern of challenges
against a discrete group and a reasonable inference that such challenges are
based solely on group affiliation.' 28
 In demonstrating a reasonable inference,
it is essential that the complaining party show a disproportionate exclusion of
a discrete grup as compared to the remaining discrete groups on the jury
panel. 12 " The court also noted other significant, but not essential, elements to
be considered by the trial judge in ruling on the objection, such as group
affiliation between the defendant and the excluded group, and common
group membership between the victim and a significant number of the re-
maining jurors.'"
If the complaining party has demonstrated prima facie evidence raising
an inference that a discrete group has been excluded, the burden of proof
then shifts to the allegedly offending party to rebut the apparent misuse of
peremptory challenges. While the reasons offered in rebuttal need not meet
the requirements for a challenge for cause, the burden of justifying
peremptory challenges is, nevertheless, a difficult one. 13 ' The Soares court
indicated that specific grounds showing individual bias must be offered for
"each member excluded."'" Quoting Wheeler, the court expressed confidence
in the ability of trial judges to distinguish "bona fide reasons" from "sham
excuses belatedly contrived" to obfuscate the improper use of peremptory
challenges.'" The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that if insufficient jus-
tification is offered to sustain contested peremptory challenges,'" a trial court
would be warranted in finding an improper group exclusion and in utilizing
the appropriate remedy.'"
Again referring to the Wheeler decision, the court in Soares defined a
remedy which restores diffused impartiality to the petit jury.'" If the trial
judge finds that the exercise of peremptory challenges has eliminated a dis-
crete group improperly, he has necessarily concluded that the representa-
tional qualities of diffused impartiality also have been stripped from the jury
panel.' 37 The court held, therefore, that a trial judge must excuse not only
the jurors already seated, but any jurors remaining in the venire as well and
begin juror selection anew.' 38 This procedure assures the presence of dif-
127 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 629-30 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35.
' 28 Id. at 628-32, 387 N.E.2c1 at 516-18.
12" Id. at 629, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
13" Id. at 630, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
131 Id. at 629-30, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
132 Id. at 6 3 0-3 1, 387 N.E.2d at 517 (emphasis added).
133 Id.
1114 Id. at 632, 387 N.E.2d at 518 (quoting 22 Cal. 3d at 282. 583 P.2d at 765,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 906).
135
 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 630, 387 N.E.2d at 518; see KutiN , supra note 24, at
295 (trial judge capable of making decisions as to use of challenges even if close judg-
ments).
13" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 517-18.
'" 7 Id.
138 Id.
1212	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:1197
fused impartiality and guarantees both parties a petit jury which represents
the community sense of justice as nearly as "the process of random draw
permits."' 3"
III. EVALUATION
A. The Rationale of Soares and Wheeler
The fundamental element of the rationale advanced by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in Soares, and by the California Supreme Court in Wheeler, is the
assumption that individual jurors hold opinions and beliefs, derived from
their membership in societal groups, which they will assert in the course of
jury deliberations. ] '" Both courts arrived at this novel proposition after
lengthy analyses of those United States Supreme Court decisions, culminating
in Taylor, which established the sixth amendment right to a jury that is drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community."' These federal deci-
sions, however, were concerned exclusively with the problems related to the
early stages of jury selection and do not readily support the interpretation
offered by the two state courts.
The rationale underlying the Supreme judicial Court's decision in Soares
and the California Supreme Court's decision in Wheeler consists of two distinct
aspects. First, both state courts assume a correlation between group member-
ship and the beliefs and opinions of individual group members. The court in
Wheeler, for example, asserted that one consideration supporting a defendant's
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury is the recognition that every per-
son possesses "deep rooted biases derived from their life experiences." 142
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court admitted that this rationale is "of-
ten unstated." 1 " In similar fashion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that diffused impartiality—a diversity of individual opinion
derived from group affiliation—is a "key objective" secured by the guarantee
of representative cross-section of the community. 144
Yet, the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly linked indi-
vidual beliefs with group membership. 14 ' The Court has looked, instead, to
groups present in society to measure objectively the validity of state jury selec-
tion procedures. In Peters v. Kiff,'" for example, the Court minimized the
importance of internal identification and similarity of values among members
of a particular group.' 47 Group affiliation appears to be merely a means to
identify the extent of community participation in the administration of justice.
By suggesting a link between individual beliefs and group membership, the
13" Id. at 627, 387 N.E.2d at 516 (citing 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 903).
14" See Prosecutorial Misuse, supra note 46, at 1178.
141 See text and note at note 52 supra.
142 22 Cal. 3d at 266, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
143 Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
144 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
14 ' Prosecutorial Misuse, supra note 69, at 1178-79; Comment, 13 SUFFOLK U.L.
Rev. at 1091.
' 4 " 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
147 Id. at 503-04.
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Massachusetts and California courts have asserted a strained, albeit novel, in-
terpretation of the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community.
As the second distinct aspect of their similar rationales, the courts in both
Wheeler and Soares assumed that individual jurors vigorously assert their re-
spective group-related biases during jury deliberations. The California Su-
preme Court in Wheeler suggested that diverse biases should be present in
order to assure that antagonistic biases "will tend to cancel each other out. >, 148
Similarly, in Soares, the Supreme Judicial Court feared that if minority group
biases were eliminated from the jury, majority group biases would dominate
the debate.'" Neither court addressed the implications of this conclusion.'S 0
Nevertheless, this portrayal of the jury debate would appear to conflict with
the more traditional view of the jury as an impartial finder of facts. In the
view of both the Wheeler and Soares courts, interaction between partial jurors,
jurors swayed by "deep-rooted biases," will produce an impartial verdict. Even
if jurors do, in fact, assert their respective biases, it is anomalous that both
courts, in their effort to foster impartial juror selection, would conclude that
passion rather than dispassion, conflict rather than consideration, will produce
a fair decision.'• 1
Adopting identical rationales, the California Supreme Court in Wheeler
and the Supreme Judicial Court in Soares first stated a tenuous interpretation
of the right to a fair and impartial jury and then characterized the decision-
making process as an adversarial encounter among a group of opponents.
Each demonstrates the problems with the courts' conceptual analysis. Of more
significance, however, is the effect of the Soares decision on the process of voir
dire.
B. Additional Burden on Voir Dire
By opening the peremptory challenge to inquiry, the Supreme Judicial
Court in Soares created a corresponding need for objective evidence in order
to prove whether peremptory challenges, in fact, arc being exercised in light
of individual characteristics. The court emphasized the necessity of creating a
complete record against the possibility of appeal. 152 While the court explicitly
referred to the duty incumbent on the party alleging the misuse of
peremptory challenges to create a clear record, the party exercising those
challenges also will seek to establish evidence of specific, individual biases in
anticipation of a possible objection. To accomplish their respective needs, both
parties will turn to the voir dire process. In practice, however, the necessity of
148
 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at. 902.
14 " 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626-27, 387 N.E.2d at 515-16.
' 5 ° But see 22 Cal. 3d at 288, 583 P.2d at 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (Richardson
dissenting).
151 Id. at 292, 583 P.2d at 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
("Dissension, to the extent that it reflects only a clash of 'respective biasies' of indi-
vidual jurors, is no guarantee whatever of impartiality.").
152
 1979 Mass. Ads'. Sh. at 608-10 11.8, 387 N.E.2d at 508-09; see 22 Cal. 3d at
263-65, 583 P.2d at 753-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95 (defense counsel's problems in
creating an adequate record for appeal).
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justifying peremptory challenges places an excessive burden on the voir dire
process, a burden which that process is not designed to handle.
While voir dire is the only means available for establishing the grounds
necessary to support or to attack the exercise of peremptory challenges, pro-
cedures for conducting voir dire vary widely.' 53 Some jurisdictions, believing
that properly supervised exchange between attorney and juror will success-
fully weed out biased individuals, allow both sides to question the panel di-
rectly.'" Other jurisdictions, fearing that voir dire often is abused to create
predispositions in jurors, grant the trial judge discretionary power to deter-
mine voir dire procedures.' 55 Massachusetts judges, although given the op-
tion to allow attorney inquiries, invariably assume jury questioning them-
selves.' 5 ''
Because voir dire is designed to reveal the narrow statutory elements of a
challenge for cause, it is seldom pursued with the purpose of uncovering
more general bias or prejudice.'• 7 Even if the questioning is extensive and
probing, some doubt its effectiveness. These critics point out that potential
jurors often do not recognize the subtle traits or slanted perspectives which
may govern their personalities.'" Other potential jurors, well aware of a pre-
" 3 See FED, P. Civ, P. 47; FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a); ABA Standards, supra note 4,
at § 2.4; rf Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving Its Wonderful Power, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545
(1975); VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 165-66.
151 See Cal. Rules of Court, r. 516 (judges shall allow counsel to question jurors
(emphasis added)).
155 See ABA Standards, supra note 4, at § 2.4 (judge should initiate questioning,
then allow parties questions as he deems proper).
' 51 ' MASS. GE N. LAWS ANN. ch . 234, § 28 (West 1968); MASS. R. Ctv. P. 47;
NL R. Oust. P. 20(b)(1). Ostensibly these statutes permit questioning of jurors by
counsel. The consistent policy of the Superior Court has been for the trial judge to
retain control of all questioning while incorporating questions submitted by counsel.
This narrowly circumscribed procedure contrasts sharply with the methods used
in California courts. See note 154 supra. The court in Wheeler emphasizes the relevance
of an attorney's conduct during voir dire as evidence that peremptory challenges are
based on group bias. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906
(failure to ask challenged jurors more than desultory questions is additional evidence
of group exclusion). The court in Soares failed to discuss this significant difference in
trial procedures. It will be far more difficult to establish evidence on the record of
"specific bias" in Massachusetts courts which do not permit exchange between counsel
and jurors.
157 The scope of voir dire remains almost completely within the discretion of
the trial judge; subject to review only in the most blatant instances of abuse. One area
of inquiry which has been recently expanded is that of racial prejudice. Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Ristaino v. Ross 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Lumley, 367 Mass. 213, 327 N.E2d 683 (1975). A 1975 amendment to the Mas-
sachusetts voir dire statute made mandatory questioning with respect to "considera-
tions, attitudes, exposure, opinions" which might influence a potential juror when race
is an issue in the trial. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, ch. 234, § 28 (West Supp. 1979).
Nevertheless, the trial judge still retains control over the manner, form and extent of
questioning. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 144-45, 160-66; People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d
815, 506 P.2c1 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
L5M Broeder, Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 88 S. CAL. L. RE-,v. 503, 505-21 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Broeder] (voir dire grossly ineffective even in eliciting data which
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disposition, may refuse to answer truthfully in the public forum of a court-
room. 15 ' As the judge conducts the voir dire, counsel must look for personal
mannerisms or attitudes which, in light of common experience, may indicate a
juror's attitude or predisposition. Such subtle hints, perhaps evident only to
the alert attorney, certainly will not appear in the record. if an objection is
raised later by opposing counsel alleging group-based peremptory challenges,
little or no discernable evidence will be available to support possibly legitimate
assertions that a juror holds a specific bias.'"
The formidable task of creating a record sufficient to substantiate each
peremptory challenge places counsel in a dilemma. Concerned that his chal-
lenge may be questioned, he may request further inquiry in the hope of high-
lighting a suspected bias. This tactic, even if successful, risks alienating the
remaining jurors who will not fail to perceive the source of the additional
questions."" If counsel simply exercises his challenges instead, he risks an
adverse finding by the trial judge and the dismissal of the venire.'" Too
often counsel may accept a questionable juror out of fear that his inchoate,
but nevertheless legitimate, suspicions will not be sufficient to justify his
peremptory challenges. As a result, the voir dire process is ill-equipped to
shoulder the new evidentiary burden created by the Soares decision. To the
extent that the voir dire ineffectively reveals juror bias, vigorous use of the
peremptory challenge is hampered. Consequently, Soares, while purporting to
eliminate peremptory challenges which improperly disrupt diffused impartial-
ity, also may inhibit those challenges motivated by the "spectre of individual
bias"—a result contrary to the intent of the decision.'"
may suggest bias). The system is further handicapped by counsel who do not use their
questions effectively. For a humorous, fictional account of voir dire and a subsequent
trial, see Starrett, The Eleventh Juror, in MASTERPIECES Or LEGAL. Fn .,:TioN 719 (1964)
(wrongly-accused defendant acquitted of murder by jury of which actual perpetrator
of the crime is a member).
15" Broeder, supra note 158, at 515-16.
1 "" Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 204, 583 P.2d at 774, 148 Cal. Rpt.r. at. 915.
(Richardson, j., dissenting) (subtle signals which prompt peremptory challenges do not
appear in the cold record). Recognizing the possibility that his peremptory challenges
may be questioned, alert counsel may wish to make an offer of proof concerning the
reasons for particular challenges. Placing counsel in this position may significantly
deter the use of peremptory challenges. See text and notes at notes 106-08 & 145.
Counsel may approach the bench and explain the questions he wishes asked.
See note 102 supra. Assuming the trial judge agrees to ask the questions, the jurors,
observing the side-bar conference, cannot help but realize that counsel requested the
additional inquiry. If, then, the same attorney uses peremptory challenges against
some of the jurors, those remaining may react unfavorably.
"'2
 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 518 (venire must be quashed
in order to restore representative cross-sectional balance in the new panel). In many
instances, if jury selection has already taken some time, most of the available jurors will
have been called for the trial already, If the venire is then quashed, the trial may have
to be suspended for several weeks until a new group of jurors is assembled. If`, how-
ever, jurors are available so that new selection can begin, the same trial judge will
preside over the trial. No judge will be pleased al having spent valuable trial time only
to have the panel rendered unfair by the conduct of counsel.
163 Id. at 623-24, 387 N.E.2d at 514.
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C. Procedural Ramifications of Soares
The court in Soares defined a two-part test which objections to the use of
peremptory challenges must satisfy. The first element of this test requires a
party to demonstrate a pattern of peremptory challenges. 16" This aspect of
the test appears to be objective and should present few difficulties. When
immutable characteristics link the challenges, and counsel is careful to pre-
serve the trial record, proof of an apparent pattern should be fairly simple. 165
Nevertheless, practical considerations may hinder efforts to prove the exis-
tence of a discrete group based on creed or national origin. More information
than the name, address, and occupation of the jurors and their spouses is
rarely available."" Trial judges, during the course of voir dire, will demand
strong justification before questioning jurors concerning their religious beliefs
or national heritage.'" Consequently, this informational gap could handicap
the complaining party in showing a series of challenges which constitute a
discrete group of challenged jurors.
In addition to objective evidence of a discernable pattern, the two-part
test also requires subjective evidence which reveals the purpose behind the
pattern of challenges. The Soares court carefully noted that a party need not
show any direct relationship between a pattern of challenges and the issues at
trial.'" Therefore, in theory, the complaining party may simply point to the
exclusion of a discrete group and thereby also prove the subjective fact that
the exclusion was predicated on membership in the discrete group. The test
formulated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Soares does not appear to re-
quire a more stringent degree of proof.'"
Once prima facie exclusion of a discrete group has been shown, the al-
legedly offending party seeking to justify an apparent pattern of peremptory
challenges against a discrete group, is confronted with a difficult task. The
court in Soares created a strong presumption against. the validity of challenges
which limit representation of societal groups on the petit jury: 7" The al-
"'4 Id. at. 628-29, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.
1"5 See text and note at note 152 .copra.
''" The typical jury list in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a computer
print-out compiled primarily from voter registration lists. It is composed as follows:
juror name	 juror home address	 Ward
_juror employer	 Employment address	 juror occupation
Spouse's employer	 Spouse's employment address	 Spouse's occupation
(line two and three deleted if unavailable)
' 67 Trial judges arc fearful of arousing racial or ethnic issues unless they are
inextricably hound up in the issues at trial. See, e.g., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 608-09 n.6,
387 N.E.2c1 at 508 11.6.
Ir Id. at 629, 387 N.E.2c1 at 517.
"" But see id. at 629-30, 387 N.E.2d at 517 (court discusses evidence which is
persuasive on the issue of systematic exclusion). The court noted that 92% of the
available black jurors were excluded as compared to only 34% of the white jurors. Id.
The California Supreme Court in Wheeler refused to use any statistical evidence in
evaluating the purpose behind a series of challenges. 22 Cal. 3d at 278-80, 583 P.2d at
763-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
"'" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 625-26, 387 N.E.2d at 515 (cultural, family and
community experience essential elements of diffused inipartiality).
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legedly offending party has two choices in suggesting reasons other than the
assumption of group affiliation as the basis for a pattern of challenges. First,
counsel may show that, while the excluded jurors share a common group
membership, they also share a common specific trait which is significant in the
trial. For example, those jurors eliminated all may be black, but they also may
live in the same general neighborhood as the defendant. Thus, counsel may
fear that these persons could be aware of extraneous information about the
defendant or the facts of the case which would affect their judgment. If this
argument. is not a sham, counsel will have available geographical infbrmation
and, quite probably, will have excluded potential white jurors for the same
reason.' 71
A second choice available to counsel is to support each exclusion indi-
vidually within the discrete group.i 72
 The court in Soares noted several
examples of sufficiently specific and particular reasons which would justify a
peremptory challenge. The court suggested that a potential juror with a prior
arrest record, or one who had been the victim of a crime or whose manner of
dress suggests "unconventional lifestyle" could be excluded legitimately by use
of a peremptory challenge.' 73
 The court also indicated, however, that specific
grounds must be offered for "each group member excluded." 174 The burden
of justifying a pattern of challenges by showing a unique bias in each
excluded juror is, therefore, a formidable task, especially when the limitations
of voir dire are considered. 175
 If a trial judge refuses to accept the specific
grounds offered to support even one of a pattern of challenges, he would be
warranted in exercising the remedy delineated by the court.'"
The remedy defined by the court in Soares requires the trial judge, upon
finding a systematic use of peremptory challenges, to dismiss the remaining
seated jurors and quash the entire venire.'" This remedy is expressly de-
signed to restore diffused impartiality by reconvening a jury which satisfies
the cross-sectional balance contemplated by article twelve of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. Although other, less drastic solutions may come to
mind, the court suggests no alternatives. Further, because the remedy secures
a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, the requirement that the ve-
nire must be quashed in favor of an entirely new venire appears to be the
exclusive remedy contemplated by the court.
In a footnote the court promised, however, to "study the experience
which develops" including 'judicial reactions" to the procedures and remedy
outlined! in Spares. Apparently, the Supreme Judicial Court expected different
reactions at the trial court level to the procedural aspects of Soarer. An exam-
ple of one trial judge's reaction to Soares is the recent trial in Commonwealth v.
17 ' Id. at 631, 387 N.E.2c1 at 517 (quoting 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 764,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 905).
172
 1979 Mass. Aclv. Sh. at 623, 387 N.E.2d at 514,
1 " Id. at 623-24 n.27, 387 N.E.2d at 514 n.27,
174 Id. at 632, 387 N.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
'" Sec text and notes at note 131 supra.
176 Id. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 517-18.
177 Id.
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Sanders. 178 In Sanders, a jury trial of a black man for the rape of a white
woman, the trial judge required counsel from both sides to disclose, before
the exercise of a peremptory challenge, the reasons prompting each chal-
lenge. After eleven jurors were seated, the Commonwealth attempted to chal-
lenge a black man. The trial judge, rejecting the reasons offered by the pro-
secution in support of its challenge, refused to exclude the juror and ordered
that he be seated on the panel.'" The Commonwealth petitioned the Sup-
reme judicial Court for extraordinary interlocutory review and requested the
court to invalidate the unique procedure used by the trial judge. The Com-
monwealth, as the basis for its petition, asserted that the exclusive remedy
available to the trial judge was to quash the jury venire and begin selection anew.
In a memorandum opinion, Justice Abrams declined to invoke the court's
supervisory powers and stated that the "cutting edge" of the Soares decision is
the procedural discretion of the trial judge to resolve problems as they arise at
trial.'" While not expressing the position of the full court, this memorandum
opinion indicates a willingness to accommodate the efforts of trial judges to
enforce the mandates of Soares. In effect, the trial judge in Sanders refused to
wait for a pattern of challenges to emerge and dispensed with the elaborate
proof and remedy procedures of Soares. The result was a streamlined proce-
dure which, nevertheless, prevented the use of peremptory challenges to
eliminate a discrete group.
Whether the procedures outlined in Soares are exclusive is a question to
be answered definitively in the future. At present, Sanders may exemplify
merely the dissatisfaction of trial judges with that aspect of Soares which re-
quires the dismissal of the jury venire after improper use of peremptory chal-
lenges. Persuasive in theory, this remedy appears ponderous and excessive in
practice. The approach taken by the trial judge in Sanders is an effective al-
ternative.
In sum, the California Supreme Court in Wheeler and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Soares stated a novel interpretation of a defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury. While both courts advanced a strained in-
terpretation of federal precedent, both courts also were faced with a factual
situation that clearly required redress. Nevertheless, the two state court deci-
sions do present several drawbacks. First, the threat that either party may be
forced to justify its use of peremptory challenges places a heavy burden on
the voir dire stage of jury selection. Second, the threat of objection to a pat-
tern of challenges unintentionally may hamper the valuable role of the
peremptory challenge in obtaining an impartial jury. Filially, the remedy de-
fined by both courts is certainly unwieldy and, in light of recent experience at
the trial court level, may be unnecessary.
In large part, these difficulties are most visible in fact situations where the
discrete group allegedly excluded is based on some group other than race.
Ironically, if the court in Soares had employed an alternative rationale to jus-
17 " Commonwealth v. Sanders, No. 79-476, slip op. (Mass. Nov. 13, 1979) (Ab-
rams, j., single justice).
"7" Id. at 1.




tify its decision, the broad holding which included sex, religion and national
origin as well as race, may have been unnecessary.
III. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS: EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Framing its decision within the context of Articles 12 and 15 of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution,'" the Supreme judicial Court defined the term "dis-
crete group" to include several distinct societal groups which traditionally
have been afforded protection under the state consfitution." 2 Refusing to
limit the term solely to groups based on race,'"" the court looked beyond the
facts of Soares and offered a broad definition of discrete groups which in-
cluded race, sex, religion and national origin.'" A party able to prove inten-
tional elimination of any such discrete group is entitled to a new jury venire
from which to draw a new jury panel.'"' With respect to the facts of
Soares
—peremptory challenges purposefully employed to exclude black
jurors—the decision is beyond reproach. Faced with a situation which de-
manded a remedy, the court, to its lasting credit, fashioned a commendable
solution.
Nevertheless, in extending the scope of its holding to incorporate groups
other than race, the court in Soares may have offered protection where none
was required. Focusing on the subjective intent of counsel in the use of
peremptory challenges,'" the court implicitly assumed that the same inequity
occurs whether a pattern of challenges is related to race or to sex, religion or
national origin.'" Yet, if one considers the use of peremptory challenges in
light of their effect upon the composition of the jury panel, the court was
apparently mistaken in assuming that challenges based on group association
are uniformly improper. If both parties in a particular trial have an equal
opportunity to challenge prospective jurors for whatever reason, then no sub-
stantial harm occurs. Conversely, if for reasons related solely to the issues in a
given trial, one party has a significant. advantage in its ability to challenge
arguably biased jurors, then a material inequity results and steps should be
taken to neutralize the advantage. As will be demonstrated, only when
peremptory challenges are employed to eliminate black jurors in the context
of a trial influenced by racial issues' is there sufficient reason to require
counsel to disclose his reasons for challenging prospective jurors.
' 8 ' See text. at note 12 supra.
182 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627-28, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
182 See 22 Cal. 3d at 280 n.26, 583 13 .2d at 561 n.26, 148 Cat. Rptr. at 905 n.26;
see note 92 supra.
184 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627-28, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
":" Id. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 51''-18.
' 8 " See text al note 168 supra.
"7 See 1979 Mass. Ads'. Sh. at 627-28, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
1 " There is no better example of a trial dominated by racial issues than the
Soares trial. The homicide occurred during a gang fight—white college students
against black inner-city residents. In effect, the trial simply pitted the two sides against
each other again.
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In Soares, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the peremptory
challenge retains a valuable role in the selection of an impartial jury. It is
helpful, therefore, to examine the theoretical basis which justifies the arbitrary
elimination of randomly-selected jurors. Ideally, the peremptory challenge
aids parties' in obtaining a jury devoid of predisposition with respect to the
issues and participants in the trial at hand. 189 Viewing the potential jurors as
a spectrum of conscious and unconscious biases, each side seeks to eliminate
those persons who arguably may hold views at the extremes of that spec-
trum.'" The attorney exercising a challenge quite understandably hopes to
obtain a new juror more favorable to his client along this spectrum of biases.
If the system operates correctly, however, the opposing side will exercise its
peremptory challenges in the same manner and exclude a replacement juror
who seems unfavorable to its position. The entire system is predicated upon
the assumption that there are available jurors who will fall somewhere near
the middle of the spectrum of biases."' These persons, with no discernable
interest. in the outcome of the particular trial, should be able to set aside those
biases inherent in every person and objectively consider the evidence fairly
presented at trial. The competitive exercise of peremptory challenges im-
proves the composition of the jury panel by narrowing the spectrum of juror
biases.
This portrayal of jury selection during a routine trial contrasts vividly
with a trial where race is inextricably bound up in the proceedings." 2 When
race becomes an integral element at trial there can be no routine jury selec-
tion. There is no spectrum of juror biases because every potential juror argu-
ably will be identified with one side in the trial. This is not to assume that
each juror will somehow be swayed by biases derived from group associa-
tion.'" Nevertheless, the particular situation forces counsel to recognize a
juror's race in evaluating his potential reactions during the trial. Yet, tradi-
tional use of the peremptory challenge is futile because prosecution and de-
fense do not begin on an even footing, hoping to reach some middle ground
of impartiality. In the racially-charged atmosphere of a trial such as the Soarer
trial, each peremptory challenge replaced bias with bias rather than exchang-
ing bias for impartiality.
In the example of the Soares trial, the black defendant does not have
equal access to the peremptory challenge. Unable to eliminate all white jurors,
the defendant must attempt to discover, at his peril, those white jurors who
may feel sympathy for the victim or prejudice toward the defense. The pros-
ecution need not engage in guesswork. Believing that black jurors will favor a
black defendant and possessing sufficient number of challenges," 4 the district
"" 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 623, 387 N.E.2d at 513-14; see 22 Cal. 3d at 274. 583
P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11 (extremes of potential prejudice eliminated,
leaving jury impartial).
""' See GINGER, JURY SKLECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 281 (1975).
" 1 Cf. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626. 387 N.E.2d at 513-14 (peremptory chal-
lenges designed to eliminate subtle juror prejudice).
1 "' Sec nole 188 supra.
'"3 See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617-18, 387 1'.E.2d at 512.
"4 See note 4 supra.
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attorney is able to exclude all black jurors who are called from the venire.
Further, having challenged a black juror, the replacement juror will not be
any less partial. Without a wide spectrum of juror biases, every replacement
arguably will be equally biased. It is in this situation, where the defendant is
inevitably handicapped in his effort to obtain an impartial jury, that the court
should step in to regulate the use of peremptory challenges. Only here is the
inequity sufficient to warrant a rule requiring counsel to disclose his reasons
for challenges directed at black jurors.
In comparison, the situation is distinctly different if, instead of
a series of challenges based on race, counsel employs peremptory challenges
to eliminate a group of jurors sharing the same religion or national origin. In
this instance, the jury is composed of a full spectrum of religious affiliations
or national heritage. For example, an attorney may decide, based on various
trial-related reasons, that jurors with a Roman Catholic background are less
beneficial to his client's interests than jurors of other religious backgrounds.
Yet, in challenging Catholic jurors, counsel does not automatically gain a
favorable juror. Rather, he eliminates a juror arguably biased against his
client's interests and, in all likelihood, gains a new juror closer to the middle
along the spectrum of biases.
The same reasoning applies to peremptory challenges aimed at a group
of jurors of the same national origin. In the Soares trial, defense counsel at-
tempted to exclude jurors of Italian descent, fearing that such jurors would be
swayed by sympathy for the victim or the victim's family.'" While the Soares
court would have held such use of peremptory challenges to be improper,'"
if one looks again to the spectrum of biases within the jury panel it appears
that peremptory challenges are exerting a positive influence on the jury
panel. Defense counsel, wishing to employ his challenges in his client's best
interest, quite reasonably concluded that jurors of the same national origin as
the victim should he regarded as one extreme in the spectrum of juror biases.
Since this use of peremptory challenges aids in securing an impartial jury,
there is no reason why it should not be permitted.
The concern of the court. in Soares over the use of peremptory challenges
based on the sex of prospective jurors also is misplaced, although for a
different reason than in the case of religion or national origin. In no other
situation could there be a more equal opportunity for either party to direct
peremptory challenges at one sex or the other. Yet., while the opportunity
may be equal, any attempt would be futile. If the state's jury selection proce-
dure is reasonably competent,'" then the percentage of both sexes in the jury
venire will be roughly equal. To employ a series of peremptory challenges
against one sex would be a futile gesture and, clearly, not in the best interests
of one's client.
"5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sit. 629-30 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
191i
" 7 Should there he a marked disproportion between the number of petit jurors
of either sex, the state's jury selection procedures which take place before trial would
be open to attack. The court's decision in Soares protects a defendant's right to an
impartial petit jury. The court assumed that the procedures which went into composing
a particular petit jury satisfied constitutional standards.
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In conclusion, the court in Soares recognized that there are proper and
improper uses for the peremptory challenge. Unfortunately, by expanding its
holding to include groups other than race, the court has inhibited legitimate
uses of the peremptory challenge. Only in the context of a trial in which racial
issues have effectively eliminated impartiality within the jury panel should the
court take the extreme step of opening the peremptory challenge to inquiry.
In all other cases, either party has equal access in the exercise of peremptory
challenges and their use should continue unfettered.
CONCLUSION
With its decision in Soares, the Supreme Judicial Court became only the
second state court to hold that a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury
is violated when the prosecution purposefully exercises peremptory challenges
to eliminate black jurors. Rejecting federal precedent which had offered no
more than illusory protection to earlier defendants, the Massachusetts court
followed the California Supreme Court decision in Wheeler and concluded that
the "diffused impartiality" of a randomly-selected jury cannot be disturbed by
peremptory challenges motivated solely by an assumption of bias derived
from group association. While the decision has produced some procedural
uncertainties at the trial level and the holding may have been unnecessarily
broad, nevertheless, the Soares decision represents a state court's refusal to
follow blindly federal precedent which is perceived to he unnecessarily restric-
tive. The influence of Soares and Wheeler in other states and at the federal
level remains to be seen. Beyond doubt is the strong, independent stand taken
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
THOMAS J. LYNCH
